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1. Introduction 
 The Patent and Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution proscribes that 
Intellectual Property rights are granted “to promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”1 The Framers’ rationale2 behind the Clause is that 
Congress gives authors incentives to create new works, by granting them excusive rights 
in Copyright, in order to further promote progress and the betterment of society and the 
general public through creation of new works of art and widespread access to a large base 
of creative works.
3
 This rationale, also known as the Utilitarian Theory of Copyright, is 
premised upon the fact that Congress’ grant of exclusive copyrights to authors is limited 
to a fixed number of years.
4
 Once the exclusive “limited time” copyright protection 
expires, such works of art fall into the public domain and are free to be used and enjoyed 
by the general public without restriction.
5
 Furthermore, once a work falls into the public 
domain, it has traditionally been held that it remains there for good.
6
  
                                                        
1 United States Constitution, Art. I, §8, Cl. 8 
2 Craig Joyce and L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning The Founders’ View Of The 
Copyright Power Granted To Congress In Article I, Section 8 Clause 8 Of The U.S. Constitution, 52 Emory 
L.J. 909, 947 (2003) (quoting George Washington's January 8, 1790 address to Congress, "Knowledge is, 
in every country, the surest basis of public happiness").   
3 J. Blake Pinard, Note, Defending the Public Domain-The First Amendment, the Copyright Power, and the 
Potential of Golan v. Gonzales, 61 Okla. L. Rev. 395, 398-399 (2008).  
4 William Patry, Patry on Copyright §1:1 (2007) (recognizing copyright in the United States as a "positive 
law for utilitarian purposes" and "not a property right, much less a natural right").  
5 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (U.S. 2003). 
6 David E. Shipley, Congressional Authority Over Intellectual Property Policy After Eldred v. Ashcroft: 
Deference, Empty Limitations, and Risks to the Public Domain, 70 Alb. L. Rev. 1255, 1293 (2007). 
Daniel Kohn – AWR Paper – May 11, 2012 
 
 2 
 However, this assumption about the permanence of the public domain changed 
when Congress enacted §514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”)7 in 
1994, and passed the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (“CTEA”), also known as 
the “Sony Bono Act” or “Mickey Mouse Protection Act”.8 With the passing of these two 
laws, Congress used its legislative power to directly and indirectly encroach on the public 
domain, by extending copyright duration to works that were about to expire, as well as 
reinstate copyright protection to works that were not protected at all.  
 Both acts were challenged as being unconstitutional, based on a violation the IP 
Clause of the Constitution. Recently, in January 2012, the United States Supreme Court 
held that URAA §514 was constitutional and that the restoration of copyright to works 
currently in the public domain was within Congress’ power.9 In the discussion below I 
will discuss both the Supreme Court’s holding in this case, as well as what the post-Golan 
landscape looks like for those most affected by its holding. 
2. How We Got Here: Background 
a. Sonny Bono and Mickey Mouse 
 Although important for our discussion to follow below, the CTEA is not the focus 
of this paper. As such, I will briefly discuss its content and its effect on the public 
domain.  
 The CTEA extended US copyright protection an additional twenty years. Pursuant 
to the Copyright Act of 1976 (“ ‘76 Act ”) copyright duration was generally fixed at “life 
plus 50”, so under the CTEA, Copyright duration was extended to “life plus 70”. In short, 
                                                        
7 17 U.S.C. § 104A 
8 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2), 301(c), 302, 303, 304(c)(2) 
9 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, (U.S. 2012). 
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 3 
the CTEA extended copyright protection, for works currently protected, for an additional 
twenty years. For example, if a work’s copyright was set to expire on January 1, 2014, 
under the terms of the CTEA, it would extend through January 1, 2034. While it may 
seem innocuous to add a few extra years onto a copyright’s already existing duration, by 
adding an additional twenty years of protection to these works, the CTEA prevented such 
works from entering the public domain, arguably “robbing” the general public of the 
benefit of twenty years of free use of such works. 
 The constitutionality of the CTEA was challenged in Eldred v. Ashcroft.
10
 There, 
the plaintiffs asserted that the CTEA violated the “Limited Times” provisions of the 
Copyright Clause, and the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech.11 The US District 
Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of the defendants on all grounds and the 
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia District affirmed the ruling en banc. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard the case in February 2002. 
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed both lower court rulings upholding the 
constitutionality of the CTEA. The Court pointed to prior Copyright Acts as evidence of 
Congressional precedent for extending copyrights.
12
 Moreover, the Court ruled that the 
CTEA did not violate the “Limited Times” provision, because so long as the copyrights 
did not extend in perpetuity, any duration set by Congress is “limited” and passes 
constitutional muster.
13
 In rejecting the First Amendment challenge to the CTEA, the 
                                                        
10 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (U.S. 2003) 
11 Id. at 196. 
12 Id. at 204. 
13 Id. at 210. 
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majority held that "when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours 
of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.” 14 
b. The Berne Convention 
 We will now turn our attention to the focus of the Golan case, §514 URAA. 
However, in order to fully understand section 514, we must begin our analysis in 1886 
with the signing of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, more commonly known as the Berne Convention (“Berne”). Berne is an 
international trademark agreement where each member nation agrees to provide a 
minimum level of copyright protection and treat owners from other member countries as 
they would treat owners from their own borders.
15
 Berne has three basic requirements for 
membership: (1) member-states must grant works originating in other member-states the 
same copyright protections granted to works created by its own nationals
16
; (2) copyright 
protection must automatically attach to a work, it cannot be contingent on formalities;
17
 
and (3) Berne members must grant a minimum copyright term of life of the author plus 
fifty years.
18
 
 The problem starts because the United States did not become a member of Berne 
until 1989.
19
 The US resisted joining Berne primarily because the United States 
worldview of copyrights differed from the rest of the world on a principal matter.
20
 Most 
                                                        
14 Id. at 221. 
15 Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works, Art. 5(1). World Intellectual 
Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/   
16 Id. at Art. 5(3).  
17 Id. at Art. 5(2). 
18 Id. at Art. 7(1). 
19 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 100 P.L. 568. 
20 David L. Lange, Risa J. Weaver & Shiveh Roxana Reed, Article, Golan v. Holder: Copyright In The 
Image Of The First Amendment, 11 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 83, 86 (2011). 
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other countries see copyright as a natural right of the author, evidenced by most other 
nations having some type of Moral Rights provisions included in their copyright laws.
21
 
In contrast, the US sees copyright solely through a utilitarian prism, as a means to 
incentivize creativity, encourage distribution of new works and progress science.
22
 Based 
on the “rest of the world” approach, Berne prohibits the imposition of formalities as a 
prerequisite for copyright protection.
23
 Under the 1909 Copyright Act, authors were 
required to publish their works with proper copyright notice in order to obtain a federal 
statutory copyright.
24
 Additionally, authors were required to register works in order to 
bring an action for infringement.
25
 Although nowadays, works can still be protected 
without formal registration, registration is still a prerequisite for bringing an infringement 
action in federal court.
26
 Given these strict rigid formal prerequisites for protection, many 
works, which would otherwise be eligible to receive copyright protection, fell into the 
public domain simply because they were published without following such rules.
27
 It 
should come as no surprise that many of the works that failed in following the 1909 Act 
were owned by foreign authors who were simply unfamiliar with such formalities.
28
 
Additionally, published works by foreign authors did not receive federal copyright 
protection at all because of their country of origin, as federal law only granted copyright 
protection to published works of foreign origin only when required by treaty or 
                                                        
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works, World Intellectual Property, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/   
24 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §10, repealed 1978. 
25 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §13, repealed 1978. 
26 17 U.S.C. §412. 
27 Mary LaFrance, Copyright Restoration: The Supreme Court's Upcoming Decision in Golan v. Holder, 
2011 Emerging Issues 5890. 
28  Id. 
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presidential proclamation.
29
 
 Additionally, while Berne always offered its members copyright protection for 
life of the author, plus fifty years, US protection was only for a term of twenty-eight 
years, with an option to renew for another twenty-eight, provided that the author followed 
the strict renewal formalities.
30
 As a result of its strict rules, many works that were 
eligible for copyright protection often fell into the public domain prematurely, either 
because they were published without a legally sufficient copyright notice, or because 
their copyrights were not timely renewed.
31
 Many of these works were owned by foreign 
authors or publishers who were not familiar with the formal strictures of the 1909 Act.
32
  
 With the passing of the United States’ current copyright statute, the 1976 Act33, 
the basic term of copyright protection was streamlined with Berne’s ‘life+50’ regime.34 
However, even with the passing of the 1976 Act, the US was not fully aligned with 
Berne, as it still required certain formalities when it came to renewal of works published 
pursuant to the 1909 Act.
35
 Furthermore, as a result of its failure to streamline its 
copyright law with Berne, many published foreign works continued not to receive 
copyright protection in the US.
36
 The formalities for notice and renewals were still 
enforced and therefore, noncompliance continued to cause forfeiture of rights to 
                                                        
29 Id. 
30 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §24, repealed 1978. 
31 Mary LaFrance, Supreme Court's Upheld Constitutionality of Copyright Restoration: Golan v. Holder, 
2012 Emerging Issues 6197. 
32 Id. 
33 Copyright Act of 1976, 17. U.S.C. §§101, et. seq. 
34 Copyright Act of 1976, 17. U.S.C. §302. 
35 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 874 (U.S. 2012). 
36 See supra note 27. 
Daniel Kohn – AWR Paper – May 11, 2012 
 
 7 
published foreign works well after the ‘76 Act was enacted.37 
 As the 21
st
 Century came closer and technology allowed for the global economic 
community to shrink, it became of a greater interest to ensure protection of US copyrights 
abroad. However, in order to effectively achieve this goal, the US would need to finally 
join Berne, which it did in 1989
38
. By joining Berne, the United States was now required 
to grant full copyright protection to works of authorship from fellow Berne countries, 
without any prerequisite formalities. However, even though the notice and registration 
formalities are no longer prerequisites for registration, there still are incentives to 
complying with them. For example, having proper copyright notice eliminates an 
“innocent infringer” defense when seeking and assessing damages.39 
 Article 18 of the Berne Convention requires that new member nations provide 
retroactive protection to other Berne parties' works "which, at the moment of [the 
Convention's] coming into force, have not yet fallen into the public domain in the country 
of origin through the expiry of the term of protection."
40
 In short, Art. 18 requires 
countries to protect the works of other member states, unless the work’s copyright term 
has expired in either the country where protection is claimed, or the country of origin. 
What this meant for the US was that it should have reinstated copyrights to many of these 
unprotected foreign works, whose US rights were forfeited due to their failure to follow 
certain formalities.  
 Nevertheless, the United States failed to comply with Art. 18, and there was 
                                                        
37  Id. 
38 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 100 P.L. 568. 
39 17 U.S.C. §405(b). 
40 Berne Convention, Art. 18, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/  
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nothing anyone could do to force them to act otherwise, because even though Berne 
discusses dispute resolution before the International Court of Justice, it does not specify 
sanctions for noncompliance. Moreover, it permits parties, to declare themselves "not . . . 
bound" by the Convention's dispute resolution provision.
41
 
c. The TRIPS Agreement  
 However, things changed in 1994, when most of the Berne Convention was 
incorporated into the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS 
Agreement”), as part of the WTO Agreement, in the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). The United States joined both TRIPS and 
GATT. Most importantly for our discussion, TRIPS required all its signatories to 
implement Berne's first 21 articles.
42
 Moreover, TRIPS and the WTO gave Berne 
enforcement power. Noncompliance with a WTO ruling could subject member countries 
to tariffs or other retaliation. The possibility of WTO enforcement action and tariffs 
spurred Congress into action and quickly incorporated Berne Art. 18 into US law with the 
passing §514 of the URAA.
43
  Section 514 restored US copyright protection to foreign 
works that were protectable in their country of origin but were in the public domain in the 
United States for any of the following reasons: 
(i) Noncompliance with formalities imposed at any time by United States 
copyright law, including failure of renewal, lack of proper notice, or 
failure to comply with any manufacturing requirements; 
(ii) Lack of subject matter protection in the case of sound recordings fixed 
before February 15, 1972; or 
(iii) Lack of national eligibility; [for example, if the country of origin did 
                                                        
41 Id. Art. 33 
42
 World Trade Organization, TRIPS, Art. 9.1 (requiring adherence to all but the "moral rights" provisions 
of Article), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm  
43 17 U.S.C. §104A 
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not initially share copyright reciprocity with the United States].
44
 
 
Under Section 514, the term of copyright for the foreign works would last for “the 
remainder of the term of copyright that the work would have otherwise been granted” had 
the work never fallen into the public domain in the first place.
45
 However, owners of 
these works would not receive any form of compensation for lost time when the works 
were unprotected. Section 514 simply grants them the protection they are due. It does not 
make up for any lost time. 
 Considering that these works have been in the public domain for years and people 
have been using them free of charge, Congress needed to draft provisions that would 
enable the public to phase out their use of foreign works that were once free and legal to 
enjoy, but now copyright protected. As such, section 514 did not impose liability on any 
use prior to restoration. Moreover, anyone was free to copy and use these works for an 
additional year after section 514’s effective date.46 Anyone who prepared and created 
derivative works based on a restored work was allowed to exploit the work indefinitely, 
provided they paid the copyright holder "reasonable compensation". Should the parties be 
unable to determine such an amount, a judge will determine the amount.
47
 
 Based on the above, we have now established the groundwork for understanding 
where US Copyright law has come from in its treatment of foreign works under the 1909 
Act and the 1976 Act. Moreover, we see how it came to be under Berne and URAA §514 
that Congress made changes to the Copyright Act, took these works out of the public 
                                                        
44 17 U.S.C. 104A(h)(6)(C) 
45 17 U.S.C. 104A(a)(1)(B) 
46 17 U.S.C. 104A(h) 
47 17 U.S.C. 104A(d)(3) 
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domain and restored copyright protection to these works. Now that we understand the 
current legislative landscape, we can turn our analysis to the facts and circumstances of 
Golan. 
3. The Long and Winding Road That Leads To Golan 
 This case’s path to the Supreme Court began back in September 200148. The 
plaintiffs filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality URAA §514 and the CTEA.
49
 
The named Plaintiff in this case, Lawrence Golan, is the Director of Orchestral Studies, 
Conductor, and Professor of Conducting at the University of Denver's Lamont School of 
Music.
50
 Aside from teaching, he also conducts the school's Symphony Orchestra, which 
performs 6 free concerts and 1 opera each year in Denver.
51
 The other Plaintiffs were 
various musicians, orchestra conductors, educators, performers, film archivists, and 
motion picture distributors.
52
 Golan and the other plaintiffs all depended on the public 
domain as the key source of materials to teach, perform and disseminate to their students 
and general public.
53
  
  As a result of Section 514’s restoring copyright to many foreign works, there 
were many old works that were part of Golan’s standard curriculum that he was no longer 
able to use, because they are no longer freely available in the public domain.
54
 The 
removal of free access to materials in the public domain - and the corresponding 
assurance that those materials will remain in the public domain - severely hampered the 
                                                        
48 Golan v. Ashcroft, 2001 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 373 (D. Colo. Sept. 19, 2001). 
49 Id. at 2-5. 
50 Id. at 5-6. 
51 Id. at 29-30. 
52 Id. at 6-8. 
53 Id. at 8-10. 
54 Id. at 29-31. 
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plaintiffs' ability to pursue their creative interests and promote learning in this country.
55
 
Because of URAA §514, Golan had fewer materials in the public domain to teach. He 
was even forced to forgo teaching several famous foreign works, such as works of 
Shostakovich and Prokofiev, because §514 revived copyrights in these works, which used 
to be public domain.
56
  
 The Golan plaintiffs argued that in passing the URAA §514, Congress exceeded 
its authority under the Copyright Clause, by violating the Clause’s “limited times” 
provision 
57
, as well as violating the First Amendment, by imposing the burden of 
complying with the newly restored copyright protections of URAA §514 to works that 
were once free to use in the public domain.
58
  
a. Lower Court Rulings – Round I 
 Based on the US Supreme Court’s holding that the CTEA was constitutional in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft,
59
 the district court dismissed Golan’s challenge to the CTEA.60 The 
district court then addressed Golan’s arguments regarding the Copyright Clause and the 
First Amendment. The district court granted the government’s motion for summary 
judgment concerning the argument that section §514 violates the “limited times” 
provision of the Copyright Clause. The court noted that that Congress "has historically 
demonstrated little compunction about removing copyrightable materials from the public 
domain."
61
 Moreover, the court struck down Golan’s First Amendment argument, as it 
                                                        
55 Id. at 31-33. 
56 Id. at 33-34. 
57 Id. at 55-58. 
58 Id. at 58-59. 
59 See Eldred discussion above, Supra, pages 2-3. 
60 Golan v. Gonzales, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800 (D. Colo. Apr. 19, 2005). 
61 Id. at 42. 
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failed to deviate from "the settled rule that private censorship via copyright enforcement 
does not implicate First Amendment concerns."
62
   
 Golan appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals
63
. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed that by restoring 
copyright protection to foreign works in the public domain §514 did exceed Congress’ 
power pursuant to the Copyright Clause.
64
 However, the court remanded the case back to 
the District Court because on the question whether removal of works from the public 
domain violates the First Amendment.
65
 The Circuit Court held that “since §514 has 
altered the traditional contours of copyright protection in a manner that implicates 
plaintiffs' right to free expression, it must be subject to First Amendment review.” 66 
b. Lower Court Rulings – Round II 
 On remand, the district court in Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 
2009) determined that the proper level of First Amendment scrutiny in this instance is for 
content-neutral regulations of speech, which allows speech restrictions that "advances 
important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not 
burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests."
67
 In the 
court’s opinion a restriction of free speech must be "narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest" unrelated to the suppression of free speech. Such a 
requirement is met if the restriction "promotes a substantial government interest that 
                                                        
62 Id. at 48. 
63 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007) 
64 Id. at 1186. 
65 Id. at 1196. 
66 Id. at 1197. 
67 Golan v. Holder, 611 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1170 (D. Colo. 2009) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 
520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997)).  
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would be achieved less effectively absent the restriction."
68
 The government offered three 
interests allegedly served by Section 514:  
(1) Section 514 brings the United States into substantial compliance with 
its international treaty obligations under the Berne Convention;  
(2) Section 514 helps protect the copyright interests of United States 
authors abroad;  
and (3) Section 514 corrects for historic inequities wrought on foreign 
authors who lost their United States copyrights through no fault of their 
own.
69
 
 
The court held, first, Congress could have complied with the Berne Convention without 
interfering with a substantial amount of protected speech
70. Second, the government’s 
failure to provide any evidence showing it has a significant interest that is protected by 
limiting speech per section 514, and that section 514 does not burden substantially more 
speech than necessary to further such an interest, “shows no question of material fact 
remains to be determined on this issue.”71 Third, the court expressed that “the 
Government proffers no evidence showing how granting foreign authors copyrights in the 
United States--yet denying similar protections to United States authors--could constitute 
an important Government interest.”72 As such, given the fact that URAA §514 failed to 
meet this standard, the court ruled that URAA §514 violated the First Amendment and 
was therefore unconstitutional.
73
  
 The district court’s holding was appealed to the Tenth Circuit, Golan v. Holder, 
609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. Colo. 2010), which reversed the lower court ruling, and held 
that §514 was constitutional. The court of appeals agreed with the lower court that §514 
                                                        
68 Id. at 1170-71. 
69 Id. at 1172. 
70 Id. at 1174. 
71 Id. at 1176-1177. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
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was content-neutral, but the 10
th
 Circuit held that Section 514 did not violate Golan’s 
freedom of speech because it advanced a substantial government interest in complying 
with TRIPS.
74
 By acting in compliance with TRIPS, and reaching into the public domain 
and restoring copyrights to foreign works that were not protected in the United States, 
Congress would ensure that other TRIPS signatories would reciprocate such protection 
and protect US copyrights around the world.
75
 The court noted that Congress could have 
chosen alternatives for protecting these interests, but in the end they were not 
substantially more protective of speech interests than those in §514.  
c. Supreme Court 
 As a result of the Tenth Circuit’s holding, Golan appealed, and successfully 
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The two issues 
presented before the Supreme Court in Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, (U.S. 2012) 
were:  
(1) Does the Copyright Clause prohibit Congress from taking works out of 
the public domain? 
(2) Does §514 of the URAA violate the First Amendment?  
  
In a 6-2 vote, the majority, led by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, 
and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Sotomayor (Justice Kagan recused herself), 
strongly affirmed the 10
th
 Circuit’s holding that URAA §514 is constitutional and that the 
restoration of copyright to works currently in the public domain is within Congress’ 
power.
76
 
 The Supreme Court first dealt with the question of if §514 violated the "limited 
                                                        
74 Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1090 (10th Cir. Colo. 2010) 
75 Id. at 1085. 
76 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, (U.S. 2012)  
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times" restriction of Copyright Clause. The Clause provides that “Congress shall have 
Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times to 
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings."
77
 Plaintiffs argued that based on 
this explicit grant of Copyright protection to specific works for “limited times”, that there 
was an implied barrier to granting copyright protection to works that have already entered 
the public domain. Plaintiffs further argued that there is a potential that in enacting §514 
Congress could essentially grant works perpetual copyright protection, by repeatedly 
restoring copyright protection to works that fell into the public domain. The Plaintiffs 
argued that §514 restoration violates the Copyright Clause because it takes a finite and set 
time period and transforms it into one that can potentially last forever.
78
  
 The majority disagreed with this argument, reasoning that it did not read any such 
restriction on Congress’ right to extend copyright duration in the text of the Constitution. 
Nor did the majority see evidence of such a restriction based on Congress’ prior 
legislative history or prior Supreme Court precedent.
79
 
 In addressing the issue of “Limited Times” the Court primarily relied on its 
analysis and holding in Eldred v. Ashcroft where it had upheld the CTEA
80
. The majority 
reasoned that if the CTEA did not exceed Congress's constitutional authority, then 
applying the same copyright protection to foreign works should be equally 
constitutional.
81
 The majority acknowledged that there is a critical distinction between the 
works at issue in Eldred and the works here. The works in Eldred were still under 
                                                        
77 United States Constitution, Art. I, §8, Cl. 8 
78 Golan v. Holder, at 884 
79 Id. 
80 See discussion on page 2, supra. 
81 Id. at 885. 
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copyright protection and the CTEA would extend the current protection an additional 
twenty years While here in Golan, URAA §514 granted copyright protection to works 
whose copyright expired and thus fell into the public domain.
82
 However, despite this 
critical and fundamental difference in the state of the works, the majority found this 
difference to be non-dispositive.
83
 In fact, the majority pointed to the original Copyright 
Act of 1790, as a strong proof as to the constitutionality of §514, in that both the 1790 
Act and §514 granted copyright protection to some pre-existing works that were not yet 
covered by copyright.
84
 Moreover, there were other instances when Congress granted 
protection to works already in the public domain.
85
  
 In addition to arguing the §514 violates the “Limited Times” provision, Golan 
also argued that §514 fails to "Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". 
Plaintiffs argued, since §514 only restored copyright protection to already created works 
of art, then such a grant disincentivizes additional creativity, and therefore violated the 
Copyright Clause’s “Promotion” provision.  Once again the majority pointed to its 
decision in Eldred and noted that, “the creation of at least one new work, however, is not 
the sole way Congress may promote knowledge and learning…Rather, we explained, the 
Clause ‘empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, 
in that body's judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause’…And those permissible ends, 
we held, extended beyond the creation of new works.”86  For example, compliance with 
international copyright agreements, such as Berne, promotes progress and incentivizes 
                                                        
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 886. 
85 Id. at 885-887.  
86 Id. at 888 (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 205-06, 211-12, 222). 
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new creation, thus meeting the goals of the Progress Clause, by expanding the market for 
United States works abroad and invigorate protection against international piracy of US 
works. 
 In regard to the second issue, whether §514 violated the First Amendment, the 
majority once again leaned on the Eldred holding for guidance. The majority pointed out 
that Eldred rejected the idea that copyright laws are totally immune from First 
Amendment scrutiny. Moreover, even though the CTEA had the effect of restricting 
speech and expression, it passed First Amendment scrutiny because, by its nature, the 
Copyright Act provided for certain free speech and expression provisions, namely the 
‘idea-expression dichotomy’87 and the fair use defense88 that will prevent the law from 
violating the First Amendment freedom of speech and expression. 
 The Eldred Court explained, “When…Congress has not altered the traditional 
contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”89 
However, it neglected to outline a process for evaluating what constituted a ‘traditional 
contour’, leaving it to the lower courts to develop a working doctrine. The majority in 
Golan adopted a very narrow interpretation as to what constituted the ‘traditional 
contours of copyright’. Per the Court, fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy are the  
"traditional contours of copyright" referred to in Eldred.
90
 Therefore, because §514 does 
not attack these specific built-in protections, it does not change the traditional contours of 
copyright.
91
 Furthermore, Congress adopted additional “safety” measures to ease the 
                                                        
87 17 U.S.C. §102(b) 
88
 17 U.S.C. §107 
89 Eldred at 221 
90 Golan v. Holder, at 890. 
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Daniel Kohn – AWR Paper – May 11, 2012 
 
 18 
transition from a national scheme to an international copyright regime and eased the 
impact of restoration on "reliance parties" who exploited foreign works denied protection 
before §514 took effect.   
 The Golan majority also shot down the Plaintiff’s final argument that §514 
violated the First Amendment because, here, unlike in Eldred, the public had a "vested 
right" in the works at issue, because they have already entered the public domain, and it 
would violate such vested rights to pull them out and restore copyright protection to 
them. However the majority was quick to reject this argument noting that, “petitioners 
here attempt to achieve under the banner of the First Amendment what they could not 
win under the Copyright Clause: On their view of the Copyright Clause, the public 
domain is inviolable.”92 The majority restated its earlier stated position, “nothing in the 
historical record, congressional practice, or our own jurisprudence warrants exceptional 
First Amendment solicitude for copyrighted works that were once in the public 
domain.”93 Moreover, the majority stressed that, however attractive this bright-line rule 
might be, it is not a rule rooted in the constitutional text or history. Nor can it fairly be 
gleaned from our case law.
94
  
 As such, the majority found that §514 of the URAA did not violate the Copyright 
Clause, nor did it violate the First Amendment and therefore, affirmed the holding of the 
10
th
 Circuit.   
d. Breyer’s Dissent 
                                                        
92 Id. at 891. 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 892, note 32. 
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 Just as he did in Eldred, Justice Breyer dissented from the majority opinion, 
joined by Justice Alito. Justice Breyer argued that §514 fundamentally conflicted with the 
utilitarian view of copyright law, the long-established approach to intellectual property 
law in the United States.
95
 He pointed out that, historically the monopoly privileges that 
Congress granted to authors was in exchange for them providing benefits to society. 
Justice Breyer quotes the authors of the original 1909 Act: 
The Constitution . . . provides that Congress shall have the power to grant 
[copyrights] . . . not primarily for the benefit of the author . . . but because 
the policy is believed to be for the benefit of the great body of people, in 
that it will stimulate writing and invention, to give some bonus to authors 
and inventors." H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909).
96
  
 
He argued that §514 exceeds all plausible limits of the Copyright Clause. In his view the 
Clause withdraws works from the public domain, brings about higher prices and costs, 
and in turn restricts dissemination, all without providing any additional incentive for the 
production of new material.
97
  
 Additionally, Justice Breyer noted that while it is not unprecedented, it is 
extremely and highly unusual for Congress to permit the withdrawal of creative works 
from public domain and restore copyrights.
98
 The dissent notes that the examples relied 
upon by the majority were private bills, statutes retroactively granting protection in 
wartime, all of which were designed to provide special exceptions for comparable 
equitable reasons.
99
  Accordingly, Breyer argued that it would seem farfetched to find an 
important analogy in those special circumstances to §514, which covers works that the 
                                                        
95 Supra, footnote 20. 
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98 Id. at 908. 
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author did not expect to protect in America.
100
 In fact, a look at Congressional practice 
shows the opposite. “It consists of a virtually unbroken string of legislation preventing 
the withdrawal of works from the public domain. See, e.g., Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1988, …Copyright Act of 1976…Copyright Act of 1909…Act to 
Amend the Several Acts Respecting Copy Rights …”101 
 Additionally, the dissent argued, that not only does §514 not satisfy the Copyright 
Clause because it did not encourage the creation of new works, but moreover it will 
encourage piracy and theft of such restored works by parties who don’t want to pay a fee 
to use a work with a "restored copyright" when it previously used for free. Furthermore, 
that would lead to widespread piracy, because “piracy often begets piracy…even when 
payment is possible”.102 
 Justice Breyer attacked the majority’s holding on the First Amendment issue as 
well. He notes that by allowing §514 to restore copyright to foreign works and removing 
them from the public domain, Congress is removing people’s freedom of speech.103 This 
would run counter to the Court’s prior rulings where it has shown a history of trying to 
protect the public domain and recognized the sanctity and importance of material in the 
public domain. “See Graham, 383 U.S., at 6; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 
470, 484; Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496; see also Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23.”104 
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 Breyer further attacked the majority’s arguments and argued that they are 
misguided. The majority argued that section 514 “Promotes Progress” by ensuring US 
copyrights are enforced worldwide. However Justice Breyer argued that such a concern is 
all about the author’s private rights and maximizing profits. He contended that this 
concern of protecting US copyright interest throughout the world has nothing to do with 
incentivizing the creation of new works and protecting creation and progress.
105
 
 Last, Breyer argued that this entire situation is Congress’ own doing and fault.106 
The Berne Convention did not force the US into action. In fact between 1989 and 1994, 
they never punished the US for failure to grant copyright to foreign works. It was only a 
result of WTO/TRIPS pressure that the US acts in full compliance with Berne.
107
 But 
nobody required Congress to enact §514 as it did. Congress could have complied with 
TRIPS in a different way that did not encroach on the public domain in such an egregious 
fashion.
108
 For example, Breyer suggests that Congress should have adopted some form 
of compulsory license fee for royalties to use the foreign works. Breyer concluded by 
saying, at the end of the day, by withdrawing material from the public domain, and 
combining its other features, it is clear that the Copyright Clause, as understood in light 
of the First Amendment, does not authorize Congress to enact §514. 
4. Where do we go now?   
 As a result of the Supreme Court’s holding in this case it seems unlikely that 
future challenges to the constitutionality of amendments and expansions to the 1976 Act 
will be successful. The first thing to note, that the landslide 6-2 win for the majority may 
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come off as surprising, but it really should not have surprised anyone. Golan is the 
second case that the Supreme Court heard on this type of issue, the other being Eldred, 
and in both cases it held the federal legislation at issue to be constitutional. These two 
holdings clearly indicate that the Court has adopted a firm and deferential view of 
copyright expansion and legislation. 
 I agree with the district court and Breyer’s dissent that URAA §514 should not 
pass constitutional muster, primarily because of the bedrock principle of US IP law that 
once a work falls into the public domain, it belongs to the people and should remain 
there.
109
 As such, it should follow that, unless society receives an additional, substantial 
and new benefit in return, once a work enters the public domain, it should be foreclosed 
from having the exclusive rights umbrella of copyright protection restored to it. Such is 
the purpose behind granting copyright owners and patent holders the exclusive rights they 
enjoy. The Constitution grants authors and inventors exclusive rights to exploit their 
works and inventions for a set and defined amount of time, in exchange for granting the 
general public the benefit of disclosure and free use and enjoyment of such a work after 
the exclusive rights expire. The aim is that current inventors and authors will build on the 
shoulders of those that came before them and create new works, further enhancing the 
public welfare and progress of science.
110
 
 Furthermore, the Majority’s holding seems even further puzzling given the fact 
that while it examines Congressional precedent regarding copyright restoration, it ignores 
its own precedent regarding the sanctity of the public domain. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
v. Stiffel Co., the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeals, holding that 
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a state could not use its unfair competition laws to prevent the copying of articles in the 
public domain because that would "permit the State to block off from the public 
something which federal law has said belongs to the public."
111
 Furthermore, in Graham 
v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, the Court stated, "Congress may not authorize the 
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public 
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available."
112
 Moreover, in Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., a unanimous Court held that Congress had 
determined that extending protection to knowledge already freely available to the public 
"would not only serve no socially useful purpose, but would in fact injure the public by 
removing existing knowledge from public use."
113
 Although Sears, Graham and Bonito 
Boats were patent cases, it should be presumed that the Court’s opinion as to the sanctity 
the public domain is equal for both types of constitutionally proscribed intellectual 
property. In fact, in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the Court 
explicitly articulated that the same “bedrock principle” of sanctity of the public domain 
applies to both copyright and patent. “Once the patent or copyright monopoly has 
expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and without attribution.”114 
 However, this is not to say that the majority’s opinion in Golan was without merit 
and was nonsensical. The majority was concerned with the need to streamline 
TRIPS/Berne enforcement and ensure foreign works are protected on US soil, in order to 
ensure reciprocal protection of US works internationally. While the district court and 
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dissent were concerned with the need to pass legislation that does not violate the 
Copyright Clause. The best way to balance these legitimate and conflicting concerns of is 
to, for starters, guarantee all future foreign works will receive proper full-term copyright 
protection. Doing so will ensure that these foreign works receive the full term of 
copyright protection granted under the Copyright Act, ensure that the US works are 
protected abroad and that the Clause is not violated. 
 However, a big problem still remains in regard to works currently in the public 
domain. We can balance the concerns expressed above, by allowing these works to 
remain widely available for use, but with the proviso that users must pay a compulsory 
license fee for use. Such an arrangement would ensure that owners would receive 
payment for use of their work. While at the same time, the general public would receive 
the benefit of the work without having to give up too much, in terms of actual cost to use, 
and more importantly, not having to worry about being sued for infringement of a work 
that was presumed to be public domain. Furthermore, imposing such a license fee would 
curb issues of widespread piracy, because most people are likely to pay for something 
they think it reasonably priced.  
 In order to impose such a system Congress could look at the Copyright Act for 
guidance, as it already provides provisions for compulsory licenses for certain works, 
such as non-dramatic musical compositions, public broadcasting, retransmission by cable 
TV systems, subscription and non-subscription digital audio transmissions.
115
 It is 
certainly arguable that Congress has the authority to legislate a similar compulsory 
license arrangement in this instance. Instituting such an arrangement would prevent these 
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works from having copyrights fully restored. But at the same time, it would allow authors 
to receive payment for use of their works, while at the same time not hold users liable for 
infringement.  
 Congress can follow the blueprint set up by the recording industry’s performance 
rights organizations (“PROs”), ASCAP116, BMI117 and SESAC118. These three 
organizations protect their members' musical copyrights by monitoring public 
performances of their music and compensating the artist accordingly, based on an 
arranged royalty fee.
119
 The way PROs work is that the PRO collects fees from users of 
the music created by artist, who then directly pay the artist a portion of the fee in the form 
of a royalty. This arrangement enables the user to use and enjoy the artist’s work without 
having to directly pay the copyright holder after each use, while at the same time the 
artist does not need to chase after each individual user for a fee. By using the “middle-
man” PRO, the user is able to easily pay an affordable fee for the right to use the work, 
and the artist is able to collect royalties for use of his work and not have to worry about 
widespread infringement. 
 A similar type of arrangement can easily be set up in regard to these foreign 
works, which were formerly in the public domain, but now, post-URAA §514, are subject 
to copyright restoration. Doing so would ensure that, owners of such copyrights receive 
compensation for use of their works, while at the same time this systems would not 
violate the “limited times” provisions of the Copyright Clause and for a reasonable fee, it 
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would allow society to continue the use and enjoyment of said works without the fear of 
being sued for copyright infringement. 
 Congress should set up a system, to be coordinated and run by the Copyright 
Office and Library of Congress, whereby when a person wants to use one of the foreign 
works at issue, he must pay a predetermined fee for that use. All the fees collected would 
be pooled together and primarily used to pay out royalties to the owner of the work. An 
issue addressed by the Supreme Court in the Golan decision was the difficulty and cost of 
determining the identity of the owners of the works at issue.
120
 Under this system, the 
onus of proving ownership would fall on the individual coming forward claiming 
ownership of the protected work. Any person claiming ownership of a restored work may 
come to the Copyright Office and make a prima facie evidentiary showing that they are 
the owners of the work at issue. If they meet the threshold to prove ownership, the 
Copyright Office and Library of Congress would pay them royalties, just like member 
artists receive royalties from ASCAP, BMI or SESAC.  
 Furthermore, if after an owner makes a valid proof of ownership he feels the 
royalty rate is too low, he can challenge the pre-determined rate before an administrative 
panel, which can determine the proper amount. Similarly, if two parties contest 
ownership of the same work, the administrative panel can hold evidentiary hearings to 
determine ownership. However, there very well may be many instances of works which 
will remain “unclaimed” and nobody will care to come forward claiming ownership, or 
nobody will be unable to prove ownership of such works. In such a case, all monies paid 
to the Copyright Office for use of such “unclaimed” works would be paid out to 
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institutions whose stated mission is to help promote the progress of science and useful 
arts, such as museums, theaters, research institutions, etc.  
e. And In The End… 
 As a result of the Eldred and Golan holdings, it is pretty clear as to how the 
Supreme Court views the expansion of copyright terms and duration. Furthermore, it is 
pretty clear from the way these two cases were decided that the Court is happy with the 
precedent it has established, and so it seems unlikely that it will change it stance on this 
issue in the future. Prior to issuing its ruling in January 2012, it seemed as though the 
Golan Court would affirm the district court’s holding §514 unconstitutional. The 
Supreme Court could have used this as an opportunity to instruct Congress to enact 
legislation that was more middle of the road, which would address both the concerns of 
copyright owners, who are entitled to receive full valued compensation for use of their 
work, and the concerns of users, who had been using these works for free in the public 
domain but would now be liable for infringement.  
 However, after Golan, it unfortunately appears as if the opportunity to enact such 
legislation has past, and it seems unlikely that Congress would undertake establishing 
such a system in the future. It appears that in the post-Golan world, we are left with a 
statutory scheme, which enables Congress to reach into the public domain and take works 
away from the general public and place them back under the umbrella of copyright 
protection. 
 
 
